



# 1989 All Over Again?


March 2023



# The State of Commercial Real Estate



- Investment-sales transaction volume down 51 percent YoY in February
  - 2022 sales volume: \$729.81Bln, down 15 Percent from 2021
    - Still, second highest annual volume ever.
    - Volumes started declining in 2H as rate hikes accelerated



# The State of Commercial Real Estate

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## Property Pricing

Increased by 0.92 Percent in 2022

In February, down by 6.9 Percent YoY

## Expectation

Decline of 15 Percent or More in Property Values

Driven by higher interest rates and higher credit spreads

10-Yr T Yield: 3.59% vs 1.78% in early 2021

CMBS Mortgage Coupons: 6.3% vs 3.54% in early 2021


CMBS Benchmark bond spreads: 160 bps 3/17/2022 vs  
72 bps 1/28/2022

Had ballooned last week by 20 bps.

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Yield curve is inverted. Rates, across board, much higher than in early 2022




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## Lender Volumes Have Plunged

Qtrly Mortgage REIT Originations 4Q21-4Q22



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Banks and Thrifts hold \$1.75Trn of CRE debt, or 38.6% of \$4.53Trn total  
Banks smaller than \$250Bln of assets hold 70% of bank-held  
CRE debt

Pressure on banks will have negative impact on availability of  
credit

Meanwhile ....

- \$250Bln of bank-held debt matures this year

- \$50Bln of CMBS loans mature

- 53% of bank senior loan officers report tightening standards,  
even for apartment loans (40% are tightening standards.)

- MSCI reports # of apartment lenders in 4Q down 15%

# The State of Commercial Real Estate




Retail CMBS loan maturities:

\$24Bln through 2024...\$6.1Bln, or 25% has DSCR of <1.25x

Retail is worst-performing property type in CMBS

\$8.18Bln of CMBS retail loans are DQ: 6.97% DQ Rate

CMBS Delinquency Volumes



Source: Trepp Inc.

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Office is the sector to watch, particularly commodity office  
 Risks: Work-from home; Flight to quality

CMBS Loans in Special Servicing									
PropType	Feb-23				Jan-23				Chg%
	#Loans	Bal \$mln	%ofTotal	%ofProp	#Loans	Bal \$mln	%ofTotal	%ofProp	
Retail	312	12,923.45	40.18	10.74	320	13,344.85	42.20	10.98	-3.16
Office	187	7,486.60	23.32	4.43	179	6,741.16	21.32	4.01	11.06
Hotel	227	5,877.55	18.31	6.30	237	5,994.39	18.96	6.36	-1.95
Other	101	3,898.65	12.14	3.05	102	3,914.46	12.38	3.07	-0.40
Multifamily	52	1,772.75	5.52	2.70	48	1,462.29	4.62	2.27	21.23
Industrial	9	173.43	0.54	0.40	8	164.81	0.52	0.39	5.23
TOTAL	888	32,132.43			894	31,621.96			1.61


Source: Trepp Inc.



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\$32.13Bln of CMBS loans in special servicing; 5.18% of CMBS universe



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Floating-Rate loan Issue to Watch:

Floating-rate loans typically require interest-rate caps

Those have become very expensive

\$109Bln of floating CMBS loans mature in 2023

Example: 2yr rate cap for \$25mln w/3% strike rate in Dec: \$724,000  
5% strike rate cost: \$125,000

Example: \$373Mln loan package on Wells Fargo Center in Denver  
Loan coupon: Libor + 146.9 bps, subject to Libor cap at 3%  
Cost of cap w/Libor at 4.33% would be \$7mln annually.  
At origination, Libor was 1.76%, cap cost nominal (out of the money)

# The State of Commercial Real Estate

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The 1989 CRE crisis was driven by S&L-held loans/properties  
long-duration assets and short-duration liabilities

Today: Banks are much better hedged.

But ...

- SVB held long-duration Treasuries

- Most banks hold short-duration CRE loans

- Some hold long-term loans, ie: Signature would write 5/5  
loans with five-year initial terms that would then re-set. Many  
funded via FHLBB.

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## Signature Bank:

\$110.36Bln of Assets; \$35.65Bln, or 48% in CRE

\$25.5Bln of Loans Against NYC CRE; 12% Mkt Shr

\$19.51Bln Against NYC Apartments

Many rent-stabilized

Housing Stability and Tenant Protection Act of 2019

Increased risk in portfolio by eliminating vacancy driven rent increases; repealing luxury decontrol; restricting potential rent increases.

More potential risk in additional pending regulation